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Corporate governance practice: Interview with
N R Narayana Murthy, founder, Infosys TechnologiesVijaya B. Marisetty *School of Economics, Finance, Marketing, RMIT University, Melbourne, AustraliaAbstract Taking a holistic approach, this survey paper first reviews the literature on the four
pillars of corporate governance, namely, investors, managers, directors, and law and regula-
tion, and then integrates the four components to achieve a unified framework. Attempting
to bridge the gap between principles and practice, the paper also incorporates the views of
N R Narayana Murthy, founder member of Infosys, one of the most respected corporate gover-
nance practice leaders. The emphasis in Infosys, Mr. Murthy revealed, was not on any of the
four dimensions but on the value system, ethics and integrity, and the focus on the competi-
tion was through better engagement with employees and customers.1Introduction
Over the last two decades corporate governance has
become a significant part of both academic interest and
business practice. It has reached a stage where it can be
designated as a new discipline of learning in business and
law schools and also as a separate body of knowledge in* Tel.: þ91 80 26993448; fax: þ91 80 26584050.
E-mail address: vijayabhaskar.marisetty@rmit.edu.au
0970-3896 Peer-review under responsibility of Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore.
doi:10.1016/j.iimb.2010.11.001business practice1. However, unlike other disciplines, it is
still in its nascent stage in terms of a unified framework
that can help in standardising the content of delivery. This
may be attributed to three reasons: 1) the vast length and
breadth of content that constrains the emergence ofFor instance, a simple Google search, in July 2010, on ‘corpo-
rate governance’ led to around 16 million hits compared to around
15 million hits for a specific discipline like ‘human resource
management’ and around 69 million hits for a general discipline
like ‘economics’. However, a more serious academic search on
Google Scholar yields 0.9 million, 2.8 million, and 3.2 million hits
for corporate governance, human resource management, and
economics respectively. Also it is important to note that the
number of working paper submissions to the social science research
network (ssrn) with key word or title word with corporate gover-
nance, human resource management, and economics, for year
2010 are above 1000, around 535, and above 1000 respectively for
the three above mentioned subjects.
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early stages; and 3) the overwhelming relevance of the
institutional and cultural setting that prevents any clear
uniformity across geographical or cultural regions.
The incremental contribution of this survey paper is
warranted for the following reasons: Unlike the existing
survey papers, which are mainly discipline or region based2,
this paper takes a more holistic approach. This paper also
incorporates an altruistic perspective by integrating the
literature review with excerpts based on an interview with
one of the most respected corporate governance practice
leaders, Mr. Narayana Murthy (founder member, Infosys
Ltd). This approach aims to bridge the gap between prin-
ciples and practice.
Corporate governance can be simply decomposed into
two main components, namely, a corporate entity and a set
of rules and responsibilities to accomplish the very purpose
of setting up such a corporate entity. The corporate entity
in this context is a public limited company that is mainly
visualised (in the literature) as an entity with separation of
ownership (shareholders and debt holders who finance and
own the company) and control (managers who are
employed to work in the interest of the owners). The
obvious nature of conflict of interest (between fulfilling
the owners’ interests and the managers’ self interest) is the
origin of the corporate governance debate (Berle and Mean,
1932). This obvious conflict paved way for a third compo-
nent that is now an integral part of this debate: the board
of directors, who are employed by the owners to mitigate
the obvious conflict of interest by effectively monitoring
the manager’s actions. The debate on corporate gover-
nance is important as the modern world economy is built of
these public limited companies with millions of share-
holders’ investment. It is at the heart of business school
education as business schools train students mainly to
manage or set up these corporate entities.
In a broad way, similar to the democracy debate, the
underlying fundamentals of the debate are about the
distribution of power. In other words, about whether power
given to managers is abused or used with responsibility. In
that sense, corporate governance should mirror the polit-
ical economy in which it operates. Research shows that the
nature of the political system and the corresponding laws
and institutions are positively correlated with ownership
structure and the management philosophy of corporate
entities (La Porta et.al, 1998). Hence, the fourth dimension
that influences corporate governance practice is the
expectations of the society represented by the government
and its regulation through laws and their enforcement. In
summary, investors, managers, directors, and societal
expectations are the four pillars of corporate governance
practice. It should be noted that the strength of the2 For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) focus on financial economics (agency theory) aspects,
Claessens and Fan (2002) focus on governance in Asian business
groups, and Mcconnell and Denis (2003) on non-US markets; the
surveys include Turnball’s (1997), and Daily, Dalton, and Cannella’s
(2003) on alternative theories of corporate governance, Adams,
Hermalin, and Weisbach’s (in press) survey on board of directors,
and Bebchuk and Weishbach’s (2010) survey on the recent state of
governance literature in financial economics.foundations of corporate governance practice not only
depends on the strength of the materials used (quality of
the practice) to build the pillars but also the surface on
which it is built (It does not make sense to use steel pillars
on a fluid surface). In essence, the governance mechanism
that is optimal in one political economic setting may not be
optimal in another political economic setting (surface
variation). Also, it is important to note that what is efficient
sometimes many not be optimal.
For instance, the nature of shareholders varies from
country to country. In the US, the majority of the investing
community are financial institutions like pension funds or
mutual funds. On the other hand, in India, the majority of
the investing community are families who promote public
limited companies. Hence, unlike the US where managers
and financial institutions are the dominant power, the
controlling owners (families) are the dominant power in
India. In some economies the majority of the investors
could be employees. Also, within an economy, you can find
all the three variations. Several researchers attribute the
variation in the ownership structure in different countries
to the legal and regulatory infrastructure. The legal infra-
structure can vary on a spectrum from very strong to very
weak in imposing penalties relating to power abuse. Like-
wise, the regulatory infrastructure can be anywhere from
well developed to least developed to pre-empt power
abuse. Given these exogenous differences, the manager’s
role and the board’s effectiveness in monitoring it and the
implied power struggle cannot be uniform across countries
and companies. Although the underlying principle remains
the same and simple (‘managers of others’ money should
deal with responsibility and in the interest of the owners of
the money‘), it is hard to practise and may sometimes turn
out to be not optimal! A rational manager may think that
there is nothing wrong in abusing power in his/her own
interest if there is no punishment. In a similar environment,
an influential group of investors may think that there is
nothing wrong in bribing a manager to act in their interest.
Likewise, a manager may think that there is nothing wrong
in bribing the board members for supporting his/her
personal cause. There could be an ethical debate on these
wrong doings; however, in business practice we portray
managers as rational and driven by economic incentives.
Hence, corporate governance is predominantly a context
specific subject and requires to be viewed more holistically
for altruistic practice.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. This
section is followed by a review of literature relating to
investors. The third section reviews literature related to
the board of directors. Literature related to managers and
the legal environment is discussed in sections four and five
respectively. Finally, section six summarises the article and
contains interview excerpts with Mr. Narayana Murthy,
founder member of Infosys Technologies.Investors
Investors in a corporate entity, unlike owners of tangible
property, do not see their property and just possess
a certificate as proof of owning a share of the property with
many other similar owners (whom they do not know or
32 V.B. Marisettyinteract with on a regular basis). The five main rights of
shareholders are: 1) Right to transfer their share of the
property; 2) Right to vote or represent their vote through
the proxy mechanism; 3) Right to the residual assets of the
property in case of liquidation; 4) Right to bring a suit
against the managers or the directors for any wrong doings;
and 5) Right to receive information about the company’s
activities and financial health.
Given that there are thousands (sometimes millions) of
investors, the most visible and usable right that is exercised
by the shareholders is the right to transfer their property or
sell their shares. The frequent usage of this right by many
shareholders indicates that the so called owners are mere
suppliers of capital or risk takers. Hence, the modern
corporate owner can be termed mainly as an ‘investor’.
Modern corporations have millions of investors. The
problem with multiple owners, similar to democracy, is that
there is always tension between freedom of expression and
equality. Owners are free to express their interests;
however the heterogeneity in their expressions leads to
possible inequality. Hence, they entrust the decision
making (and the underlying power) to the managers. And
for managers, in Berle and Means’s (1932) parlance,
heterogeneity is a feast. The more the number of owners
and the more their disagreement or disassociation, the
higher the concentration of power with the manager.
Hence, the wider the separation of ownership from control,
the higher the incentives to exercise private benefits of
control.Blockholders and institutional investors
Berle and Means (1932) point out that dispersed share-
holders collectively have incentives to monitor the
management of the firms in which they own stock individ-
ually. The free-rider problem can ruin such incentives,
leading to a lack of shareholder involvement in firms. This
indicates that holding huge blocks of equity is desirable and
can be used as a mechanism to distribute power. In the US
market, block trades are traded at a premium which may
convey the private benefits of power. Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) pointed out that large percentage block share-
holdings are quite prevalent in the US market. Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and many follow-up studies
have documented a robust empirical relation between
these large shareholdings and corporate performance in
a wide variety of samples spanning a number of countries
and time periods. The evidence from several studies (for
instance, Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999, Gillan and Starks
2007, Hartzell and Starks 2003, and Gillan and Starks
2007) suggests that block holders seek both to increase
firm value (shared benefits of control) and to enjoy benefits
that are not available to other shareholders (private
benefits of control). Such private benefits may come at the
expense of the other shareholders but do not need to. Like
other governance mechanisms, the extent of outside block
ownership in a firm varies systematically with other char-
acteristics of the firm; for example, ownership concentra-
tion is higher in smaller firms, ceteris paribus. There is
some evidence of a positive effect of outside block
ownership on firm actions (Holderness, 2009).Controlling shareholders
Controlling owners differ from institutional or block holding
investors in terms of their degree of involvement with the
corporate operations. Controlling owners play a more active
role. This might imply that they provide good monitoring;
however, the private benefits of control argument implies
expropriation of non-controlling shareholders’ wealth. The
nature of such governance problems with and without
a controlling shareholder has been examined by many
researchers (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
1998; Bebchuk and Hamdani 2002). The work on compara-
tive corporate governance (Becht and R€oell 1999; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998) has shown that compa-
nies with a controlling shareholder are the dominant form
among publicly traded firms inmost countries. One important
type of controlling shareholder has been labelled ‘controlling
minority shareholders’ by Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis
(2000). These are shareholders who own only a minority
(and sometimes a small minority) of the company’s cash flow
rights but control a majority of the votes and thus have a lock
on control. An owner of a minority of the cash flow rights can
control amajority of the voteswhencashflow rights and votes
are separated due to the use of dual-class stock, corporate
pyramids, or cross-holdings. Such structures are quite
common in many countries (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Bebchuk, Kraakman, and
Triantis (2000) show that such structures have the potential
to create very large agency costs that are an order of magni-
tude larger than those associated with controlling share-
holders who hold a majority of the cash flow rights in their
companies.Bertrand,Mehta,andMullainathan (2002)present
evidenceabout the significantamountof tunnelling that takes
place in Indian family business group affiliated firms. In the
United States, controlling minority shareholder structures
commonly occur through the use of dual-class shares.
Debt holders
The literature on the role of debt holders (also investors) on
firm wealth has been surveyed by Shleifer and Vishny
(1997). The need to be able to make ongoing cash
payments gives the management greater incentive to
operate efficiently, so as to produce greater cash flow. The
leveraged buyout and leveraged recapitalisation trans-
actions that were prevalent in the US market in the 1980s
provide support for the hypothesis that debt is one effec-
tive solution to the agency problems between managers
and equity shareholders.
Hedge fund investors
Hegde funds are different from other institutional investors
in terms of their investment horizon (relatively short) and
their degree of aggression (relatively greater). Unlike
activist shareholders who mounted proxy fights and take-
over bids in the past, the activist hedge funds do not
commonly seek to acquire the company themselves.
Instead, they try to affect the way in which the company is
run or to get the company to be acquired by someone else.
Given that their portfolio holdings are not disclosed it is
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publicly available data. However, their disassociation with
other investors’ interests can be harmful to firms.
Boards of directors
While the shareholders’ activism acts as the external
control governance mechanism, the board of direc-
torsdthe apex body of the corporate entitydis supposed to
act as the internal control governance mechanism. The
board of directors is elected by shareholders and is
expected to monitor and advise managers to act in the
interest of the shareholders. However, it has been recog-
nised long back (see Smith, 1776 and Berle and Means,
1932) that directors’ interests may not fully overlap with
those of the shareholders. The Enron, WorldCom, and Par-
malat debacles in the recent past have made the directors
more answerable for their actions. They raised the question
on the role of the board: is it simply a regulatory require-
ment or a real value addition to the shareholders’ wealth.
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (in press) provide
a comprehensive review of this literature. Mace (1971)
point out that directors serve as a source of advice and
counsel, as some sort of discipline, and act in crisis situa-
tions. Demb and Neubauer’s (1992) survey results find that
approximately two-thirds of the directors agreed that their
main role is to set the strategic direction of the company.
Board independence
Boards can be more effective in governance by hiring
experienced people from outside who are relatively more
independent in their views (independent directors).
However, managers prefer less independent boards.
Research evidence is consistent with this hypothesis:
Manager bargaining power, tenure, and his/her ownership
are negatively related to degree of board independence
(see Baker and Gompers, 2003, and Ryan and Wiggins,
2004). Ryan and Wiggins find that a CEO’s pay becomes
less linked to equity performance as his control over the
board increases (proxied by his tenure and the proportion
of insiders). Weisbach (1988) interacts board composition
and firm performance in a CEO turnover equation. His
results indicate that when boards are dominated by outside
directors, CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm perfor-
mance than it is in firms with insider-dominated boards.
Board size
Yermack (1996) finds that firms with smaller boards show
a stronger relationship between poor performance and CEO
turnover than do firms with larger boards. This suggests
that smaller boards can be more vigilant. However, Coles
et al. (2008) find that firm performance is increasing in
board size for certain types of firms, namely those that are
highly diversified or that are high-debt firms.
Board compensation
Perry (1999) finds that the relationship between CEO turn-
over and firm performance is stronger when boards haveincentives. This finding suggests that providing explicit
incentives to directors leads them to be more vigilant (act
more independently). Bryan and Klein (2004) find evidence
that firms with greater agency problems make greater use of
option compensation for outside directors. Adams and
Ferreira (2008) estimate the effect of meeting-attendance
fees on directors’ decisions to attend board meetings. These
authors find, somewhat surprisingly given the high opportu-
nity cost of most directors’ time, that receiving as little as
$1000 per meeting significantly increases attendance. This
indicates that directors are motivated by ‘other non-mone-
tary incentives’ to serve as directors.
The market for independent directors
The board is broadly composed of two groups: inside
directors and outside directors. Generally, a director who
is a full-time employee of the firm in question is deemed
to be an inside director, while a director whose primary
employment is not with the firm is deemed to be an outside
director. Outside directors are often taken to be indepen-
dent directors, yet the independence of some directors
who meet the definition of an outsider is questionable.
Examples of such directors are lawyers or bankers who do
business with the company. In recent years, public pressure
and regulatory requirements have led firms to have
majority outsider boards.
Fitch and Shivdasani (2006) consider a sample of 508 of
the largest US corporations between 1989 and 1995. They
find that, on average, outsiders make up 55% of directors,
insiders 30%, and affiliated directors, the remaining 15%.
Many CEOs also hold the title of Chairman of the Board; this
duality holds in almost 80% of large US firms. This structure
is viewed by many as giving CEOs greater control at the
expense of other parties, including outside directors. To
mitigate the consequent problems, many observers of
corporate governance have called for a prohibition on the
CEO serving as Chairman (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy,
1990). Adams et al. find evidence consistent with the
view that CEOs also holding the title of Chairman appear to
hold greater influence over corporate decision-making.
Ferris et al. (2003) find that there is a positive rela-
tionship between a firm’s performance and the additional
directorships acquired by its board members. However,
outsider directors could be busy and this could hurt
performance. Fitch and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms
with a majority of directors who serve on three or more
boards have lower market-to-book ratios than other firms;
moreover, they have a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to
performance. In addition, stock prices increase when busy
directors depart from the board, and when already busy
directors add an additional board seat, the stock price of
the firms on whose boards they serve declines. Overall,
these findings suggest that having busy directors on a board
can fail to be in the firm’s interests.
Type of independent directors
Booth and Deli (1996) and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) consider
the role of bankers as independent directors. These authors
find that when a director is affiliated with a bank lending to
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consistent with a view that such an affiliated director can
protect the bank’s interest by discouraging the firm from
taking loans from other banks that could increase the risk to
the director’s bank. G€uner et al. (in press) find evidence
suggesting that adding commercial bankers to boards
increases a firm’s ability to access debt markets, but that
the firms that utilise this increased financial flexibility the
most are those firms with good credit but poor investment
opportunities. G€uner et al. argue that having bankers on
boards can be a double-edged sword, in that the bankers
can improve a firm’s access to capital markets, but some-
times this improved access works to the benefit of the bank
rather than the firm doing the borrowing.
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) find that firms that are more
reliant on governmental decisions are more likely to
appoint directors with backgrounds in law and politics.
Extending this idea, Goldman et al. classify directors by the
party to which they belong. Around the time of the 2000
election, which was a very close win for George W. Bush and
the Republican Party, firms with Republican-connected
boards increased in value while Democratic-connected
firms decreased in value. This finding emphasises the value
politically-connected directors can provide and conse-
quently, the importance of these connections to firms.
Similarly, Gorton and Schmid (2004) consider employee
representation on supervisory boards in Germany. These
authors find that when labour has equal representation,
firms trade at a 31% discount to firms with 1/3 employee
representation, and have higher payrolls.
Board committees
Boards, for better focus, usually do most of their work in
committees. The main committees are: audit committee
(that oversees internal checks of all transactions), compen-
sation committee (that recommends the compensation to be
paid to the executives), nominating committee (to oversee
appointments and roles), and shareholder grievances or
governance committee (to monitor and address share-
holders’ complaints). Some authors have used these data to
draw inferences about the functioning of the board.
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) use information about the
nominating committee to draw inferences about the
manager’s influence on the board. These authors find that
when the manager serves on the nominating committee or
when there is no such committee, fewer independent direc-
tors are appointed and the stock price reaction to indepen-
dent director appointments is lower than when there is
a nominating committee that does not include the manager.
Klien (1998) considers the relation between firm
performance and board committee structures. She finds
that although there is no relation between overall board
composition and firm performance, the number of insiders
on the finance and investment committees is positively
associated with better performance.
Managers
Managers or executives or CEOs are hired to act in the
interest of shareholders. They are entrustedwith the controlof managing shareholders’ wealth under the supervision of
the board. The day to day supervision rests in their hands and
hence they are quite powerful and have information advan-
tage. Given this separation of ownership from control,
incentives play an important role in ensuring shareholders’
interests. Hence, sensitivity of mangers’ performance to the
compensation is more important than the actual level of
compensation. Managers should be more willing to act to
maximise shareholder value if doing so provides the
management with greater reward as well. The most
straightforward way to accomplish this is to have manage-
ment teams hold common stock and/or options on the
common stock of the firm.
These compensation arrangements have become the
subject of a large literature (seeCore,Guay and Larcker 2003
for surveys). The financial crisis of 2008e2009 has intensified
this debate on executive pay. With the compensation
increasing at an exponential rate (Murphy, 1999), public
attention to the compensation levels of top officials appears
to be at an all-time high. Fahlenbrach and Stulz. (2009) argue
that there is no empirical evidence that such incentives have
played a role in the run-up to the financial crisis. However,
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) contradict this by finding that
compensation levels are higher (as well as less sensitive to
performance) when governance is weaker.
Kaplan and Rauh (in press) examine the question of
whether the growth of pay can reflect market forces in
a creative way. The idea is that if executive pay reflects
market forces, then its growth should parallel that of other
highly paid professions. Kaplan and Rauh’s (in press) esti-
mates lead them to conclude that nonfinancial public
company CEOs and top executives do not represent more
than 6.5% of any of the top adjusted gross income in the US
market. Individuals in the Wall Street category comprise at
least as high a percentage of the top income brackets as
nonfinancial executives of public companies. Kaplan and
Rauh(in press) argue that this evidence suggests that the
growth of executive pay is not reflective of suboptimal
contracting, but rather is most consistent with theories of
superstars, skill-biased technological change, greater
scale, and the interaction of these effects.
Among other things, there is evidence that CEO pay is
higher when outside directors serve on multiple boards,
when the board has interlocking directors, when more of
the outside directors have been appointed under the
current CEO, when there are no large outside block holders,
when a smaller percentage of shares is held by institutional
investors, and when antitakeover protections are more
significant (see Hartzell and Starks 2003).Legal and regulatory mechanisms
The external governance of corporate entities is controlled
by legal and regulatory mechanisms.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998,
2000) have done extensive work to understand the role of
law and regulation on the ownership structure of firms. La
Porta et al. find that cross-country differences in ownership
structure, capital markets, financing, and dividend policies
are all related to the degree to which investors are legally
protected from expropriation by managers and controlling
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between the degree of such protection in a country and the
degree of ownership concentration in firms in that country.
Until the mid-1990s, most of the work on corporate gover-
nance has been in the context of US firms. But the influential
work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) and
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000, 2002) has stimulated a large
body of work on international comparisons. Much of this work
has focused on differences between the legal systems of
countries (including their systems of enforcement) and has
studied how such differences relate to differences in how
economies and capital markets perform. La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998) put forward an anti-director index for
measuring the legal protection accorded to investors, and
this index has been subsequently used by many studies.
Corporate governance practice: Interview with
N R Narayana Murthy, founder member, Infosys
TechnologiesCustomers By turning away if not satisfied
Employees Leaving the corporation or forming unions
Investors Voting in the annual general meeting
(AGM) or simply selling shares
Vendors Putting pressure or breaking
the relationship
Government
and society
Regulations and enforcement; controlling
the supply of human resources to the
corporation; controlling demand for the
products produced by the corporation.
About N R Narayana Murthy
N R Narayana Murthy, a prominent Indian entrepreneur,
is one of the founders of India’s second largest software
firm, Infosys Ltd. After 21 years service as Infosys’s
CEO, Mr. Murthy is currently associated with Infosys as
its non-executive Chairman. Mr. Murthy is an iconic
figure in the Indian software industry and often credi-
ted with being one of the pioneers of the trans-
formation of India into a major software manufacturing
destination. He has received several awards including
the Padma Vibhushan (the second highest civilian
award in India) from the Indian government and the
Legion d’honneur, the highest civilian award in France.
The Economist ranked him eighth among the top 15
most admired global leaders (2005). He was ranked
28th among the world’s most-respected business
leaders by the Financial Times (2005). He topped the
Economic Times Corporate Dossier list of India’s most
powerful CEOs for two consecutive years – 2004 and
2005. TIME magazine in November 2006, again voted
him as one of the Asian heroes who have brought about
revolutionary changes in Asia in the last 60 years.ImetMr.NarayanaMurthyon10thJune, 2010 tounderstandhis
views on the above discussed four dimensions of corporate
governance from the corporate governance practice perspec-
tive. To my surprise, Mr. Murthy’s primary focus is on none of
the four dimensions. Further, hementioned that as amanager
at Infosys (when he was the CEO), he never focused on share-
holders’ reactions (which are paramount, on average, for any
US CEO). He believes that the value system, ethics, integrity,
and focus on product market competition through better
engagement with employees and customers are of highest
priority at Infosys. In otherwords it implies that one should not
worry about governance regulations as themarket, in the long
run, forces firms to think inwards to be competitive andsustainable (going by the analogy used in the first section, the
focus should be on the surface before considering the pillars).
This sounds idealistic, but important and practical at the same
time. The debacle of Satyam Computers is a good example of
the importance of the value system while building an organi-
sation. In terms of the pillars or the corporate governance
mechanism, both Infosys and Satyam are quite comparable. In
fact, Satyam received the Golden Peacock award for the
quality of their corporate governance mechanism. However,
ex post, it is clear that the major differentiating factor
between the two firms is the surface on which they are built.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that product market
competition alone may not solve the corporate governance
problem. Further, they argue that product market competi-
tion can only reduce the degree of expropriation bymanagers
but cannot prevent managers from expropriating share-
holders’ wealth. The four pillars are the tangiblemechanisms
that provide assurance to the shareholders’ investments. It is
almost impossible for shareholders to understand the clear
intent of the managers (in an ex ante sense). Hence, Satyam
and Infosys coexist in the same environment. Even in a strong
external environment, like in the US market, managers’
wrong doings are widely visible and persist (which indicates
thatweakcorporate governance is not part of anevolutionary
process). Although this highlights the importance of the value
system, ethics and integrity while selecting managers (to
control corporate governance problems at the root level), in
an academic sense, it is difficult to model these expected
qualities. Hence, corporate governance practice should
ensure strict adherence to these principles that form the
surface of the corporate entity.
Mr. Murthy also stressed the importance of stakeholders
(rather than shareholders) which, in a broad sense, includes
everyone in thesociety (employees, customers, shareholders,
and tax payers). In his view, Infosys responds more to the
stakeholders’ expected activism than shareholders’ activism.
This can ensure sustainable growth for Infosys. The gover-
nance mechanism adopted by Infosys can be represented
though Fig. 1. The figure indicates that Infosys is built on
a surface of value systemsand responds to the expectations of
stakeholders and believes in stakeholders’ wealth creation.
VM: How do you define shareholders’ activism?
NRN: I believe in several stakeholders not just share-
holders. They include: 1) customers 2) employees 3) inves-
tors 4) vendors) and 5) the government of the land and
society in general. Each of these stakeholders by being active
ensures that there is fair, transparent, and accountable
interface between the corporation and themselves. The
activism can be expressed in the following methods:
       Investor quality 
Board quality 
Manager quality 
Product market 
competition
Legal and regulatory 
quality
Stake- 
holders’
wealth
Value
System
Figure 1 Corporate Governance Model of Infosys.
36 V.B. MarisettyAt Infosys we always focused on all stakeholders and in
fact more on the non-shareholder stakeholders. Without
the customers, employees and vendors we cannot fulfil the
interests of the shareholders.
VM: What do you think are the barriers for effective
shareholder activism?
NRN: The main barriers can be divided into two types:
market focused and regulatory focused.
Market focused barriers are mainly to do with liquidity. If
markets are not liquid then it is hard to exercise activism
(for example, shareholders cannot sell the shares). Regu-
latory focused (both self-regulation and external regula-
tion) barriers are about the rules that support and enhance
shareholder activism. For example, when I was on the
board of Unilever, Unilever practised declassified votes
whereby every year directors had to stand for elections.
This ensures shareholders’ involvement every year.
However, such a practice does not exist in India. I am for
declassified boards regulation.
VM: Do you think selection of board members should
be endogenous (as per the wishes of the internal
members) or exogenous (as a regulatory requirement)?
NRN: It has to be endogenous. If we are talking in terms
of an autonomous corporation then it is up to the existing
members of the board. They will hire those who they think
will add value. At Infosys, we have a nomination committee
of three members, headed by Mr. Jeff Leeman. All the
three members discuss the pros and cons of a prospective
member and bring it to the board. The board has a discus-
sion on the recommendations of the nomination committee
before for final approval.VM: When you hire independent directors do you hire
people for monitoring and advisory roles separately?
NRN: The board of directors has fiduciary responsibility.
Their objective is to act in the current interest and future
interest of the shareholders. Hence, they have to perform
both the monitoring role and the advisory role. In other
words, we expect every director to have expertise in both.
However, the weightage might vary based on the specific
skillset required for a few roles. For example, audit
committee members should have more financial expertise.
Likewise, risk management committee members should
have high level risk management experience. However, we
expect all the members to have enough skills to stand up
and argue on any issue whether it is strategy, finance, risk
management or something that is relevant. In summary,
everyone performs both roles.
VM: Do you think board members should have infor-
mational advantage to perform better?
NRN: Yes, I think so.
VM:It is generally believed in the analyst community
that Infosys trades at a premium due to its better
governance practices compared to a similar IT firm in
India. Does that mean that the Infosys premium reflects
the slack in the governance practices of other firms in
India?
NRN: I think this question will be best answered by the
analysts or fund managers. Having said that, it is normal for
investors to accord some premium when firms are trans-
parent, ethical and have belief in integrity. I strongly believe
that ethics, integrity, and good governance are the causes
and the effect is reflected on the so called premium. It is hard
Corporate governance survey 37to have two organisations with similar setups being traded at
different prices; thus the underlying values would drive the
premium. In the short run they may trade at the same price
but in the long run it is not sustainable.
VM: How can you credibly communicate this under-
lying value?
NRN:There is no need to put any extra effort for this.
People understand in an intuitive way. A good guy need not
boast that he is good. In the long run it reflects.
VM: Do you think shareholder activism can have
adverse effects when certain groups of shareholders, like
hedge funds, have short term vision?
NRN: At Infosys we never look at share price. We do our
bit mainly to ensure whether we represent what is best for
the firm and whether we are moving in to the future in the
right direction. I remember once we issued 30% dividend
that was the first of its kind in the industry. Everyone sug-
gested that the firm price will dip substantially due to that.
In fact, it did, only to come back after a short while. We
don’t care who the investor is (we care mainly about what
is best for the firm as a whole). The day we start worrying
about shareholders’ actions, we lose. We care about
customer satisfaction, employee happiness, and to ensure
that the future is strong. The prices will automatically
reflect our deeds.
VM: Do you think executive compensation is a function
of market forces or rent seeking behaviour of the
executives?
NRN: It is both. There are compensation consultants out
there who jack up the prices by quoting the compensation
paid to the top 1% of the corporations. Economists say:
Price is what you pay and value is what you get: We have to
be careful as we pay the price first and the value is realised
later. At Infosys we are selective and we pay what is
sustainable.References
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